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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David D. Purdum appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
his conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance challenging the 
denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
On October 8, 2003, the district court filed an order1 in a separate case 
placing Purdum on probation for possession of methamphetamine (hereafter 
"Probation Order"), which required Purdum to "submit to random blood, breath 
and/or urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his probation officer or any 
law enforcement official." (R., p.95.) Just prior, on September 26, 2003, Purdum 
signed a "Community Corrections Agreement of Supervision" (hereafter 
"Community Corrections Agreement", Exhibit d). In paragraphs 6 and 8 
respectively, Purdum agreed to submit to the search of his person and property 
and submit to controlled substances tests as requested by his supervising officer 
or agent of the Division of Community Corrections Services. (Id.) 
Two years later, Officer Reeder, "who knew that [Purdum] was on 
probation and who knew the terms of that probation" (R., p.58), saw Purdum and 
decided to stop him and request a urinalysis test (R., p.4). Officer Reeder, in his 
Purdum moved to augment the record with the district court's order the same 
day he filed his opening brief. (Motion to Augment and Statement in Support, 
Docket No. 33073, filed June 15, 2007). He later filed a revised motion. 
(Revised Motion to Augment and Statement in Support, Docket No.33073, filed 
June 19, 2007.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Purdum's revised motion to 
augment by order on June 28, 2007. (Order, Motion to Augment, Docket No. 
33073, June 28, 2007.) The pages of the order are numbered consecutively with 
the record for the convenience of the court. 
patrol vehicle, approached Purdum while Purdum was exiting his parked vehicle 
and talking on a cell phone. (Id.) As Officer Reeder approached, and before 
Officer Reeder could ask Purdum to stop, Purdum "took approximately ten steps 
then bolted." (Id.) Officer Reeder activated his patrol lights and sounded his 
horn to "make [Purdum] aware that I wanted to talk to him." (Id.) When Officer 
Reeder exited his car and located Purdum hiding under a tarp in a shed, he 
ordered Purdum out and asked Purdum why he ran. (Id.) 
Purdum continued to talk on the cell phone and Officer Reeder advised 
Purdum twice more to stop talking on the phone, but Purdum continued to talk. 
(R., p.4.) Officer Reeder then advised Purdum that if he did not stop talking, then 
he would arrest Purdum for obstruction. (Id.) Officer Reeder told Purdum that he 
was going to pat him down for weapons and Purdum "said he had a knife in his 
right pants pocket then reached in his pocket." (Id.) Officer Reeder told Purdum 
to keep his hands out of his pockets and place them on the patrol car. (Id.) 
However, as Officer Reeder began to perform a search and before any items 
were obtained from Purdum's person, Purdum fled for the second time. (R., 
pp.4-5.) 
Officer Reeder pursued Purdum, and after Purdum tripped and fell, Officer 
Reeder made contact with Purdum. (R., p.5.) Officer Peterson arrived to assist, 
and both the officers took Purdum into custody. (Id.) Officer Reeder advised 
Purdum that he was under arrest for obstruction, read Purdum his Miranda rights, 
and searched him incident to arrest. (Id.) Officer Reeder discovered multiple 
lighters and a butane lighter on Purdum's person, as well as a butane torch, a 
propane torch, Visine, and urinary supplement pills in Purdum's vehicle. (Id.) 
Relying on his training and experience that these items are associated with meth 
use, Officer Reeder opened the motor compartment of Purdum's vehicle and 
discovered a "meth bong" inside the air filter compartment of Purdum's vehicle. 
(Id.) Officer Reeder then arrested Purdum for possession of a controlled 
substance (I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1)). (R., p.6.) 
The state charged Purdum with possession of a controlled substance (I.C. 
3 37-2732(c)(I)) by information (R., p.22), and alleged that Purdum violated 
terms 5, 6, 12, and 9 of the Probation Order (R., pp.63-65). Purdum moved to 
suppress "because there was lack of probable cause or a valid reason for initially 
stopping or searching the defendant." (R., pp.27-28 (emphasis added)). The 
state and Purdum stipulated to the facts as set forth in the police report (R., pp.3- 
7), the terms of the Community Corrections Agreement (Exhibit d), and that 
Purdum's probation officer did not request that the officer stop and search 
Purdum (12/15/2005 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.4, L.11). In his brief, Purdum argued that 
"the officers who stopped Mr. Purdum had no 'individualized reasonable 
suspicion' Mr. Purdum was involved in criminal conduct." (R., p.40.) 
After a hearing on January 27, 2006 (R., pp.51-52), the district court 
determined that based on the express language of the Probation Order, Purdum 
"consented to warrantless searches as a term of his probation, and . . . 
consented to allow any probation or law enforcement officer to request a blood, 
breath, or urine test, [so] the deputy did not need reasonable suspicion to make 
the stop." (R., p.60.)2 Purdum entered a conditional guilty plea preserving the 
right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp.65-66, 68.) 
Purdum timely appeals. 
% transcript of this hearing is not part of the record on appeal and the minutes 
(R, pp.51-52) do not indicate that the court took any further evidence. 
ISSUE 
Purdum states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Purdum's Motion to 
Suppress by concluding that Mr. Purdum had waived ail of his 
Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Purdum failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Denied Purdum's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Purdum claims on appeal, as he did below (R., pp.27,40), that the officers 
did not have the authority to stop him and make a request for a drug test without 
a reasonable suspicion and he only waived his Fourth Amendment Rights to 
stops and searches performed by his probation officer. (Appellant's brief, pp.6- 
10.) However, the Probation Order plainly states that Purdum "shall submit to 
random blood, breath andlor urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his 
probation officer or anv law enforcement official." (R., p.95 (emphasis added).) If 
Purdum agreed to submit to a search of his blood, breath, and urine upon 
request of a law enforcement officer as he concedes, it follows that Officer 
Reeder had the authority to stop Purdum and make the request without any 
separate and distinct reasonable suspicion that Purdum was violating the terms 
of his probation. 
Moreover, because the officers had probable cause to arrest Purdum for 
obstruction of an officer and the officers in fact arrested Purdum for this crime, 
the searches of Purdum were justified as a search incident to arrest. The district 
court's order denying Purdum's motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. An 
appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact which are supported by 
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 ldaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 
1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences 
is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 
C. According To Paraqraph 8 Of The Probation Order The Officer Could Stop 
Purdum And Request A Random Blood, Breath. Or Urine Analysis Druq 
Test -
In both the trial court (R., p.27) and on appeal (Appellant's brief, pp.6-10) 
Purdum directly challenges Officer Reeder's authority to stop him initially and 
request a drug test (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8), and argues that because Officer 
Reeder did not have the authority to stop him under the terms of the Community 
Corrections Agreement. The state submits that because paragraph 8 of the 
Probation Order required Purdum to "submit" to a drug test by "any law 
enforcement officer" (R., p.95), it follows that Officer Reeder could stop Purdum 
and request a drug test without any separate reasonable suspicion that Purdum 
was violating the terms of his probation. 
"ldaho appellate courts have long recognized that parolees and 
probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth 
Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation." State v. Cruz, 2007 
Opinion No. 41, p.4 (June 12, 2007) (citing State v. Gawron, 112 ldaho 841, 843, 
736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987); State v. Peters, 130 ldaho 960, 963, 950 P.2d 
1299, 1302 (Ct. App. 1997)); State v. Devore, 134 ldaho 344, 347, 134 P.2d 153, 
'156 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Spencer, 139 ldaho 736, 738-740, 85 P.3d 1135 , 
1137-1139 (Ct. App. 2004). Also, a court may impose terms of probation that 
restrict constitutional rights as long as the term bears a reasonable relation to the 
defendant's criminal activities and the court gives the defendant notice of the 
terms. State v. Russell, 122 ldaho 515, 518-519, 835 P.2d 1326, 1329-1330 
(1991) (opinion vacated in part on other grounds by State v. Russell, 122 ldaho 
488, 835 P.2d 1299 (1992)). "'A defendant may decline probation, should he 
consider its terms too onerous, and demand instead to be sentenced by the 
court."' State v. Tesheep, 122 ldaho 759, 760, 838 P.2d 888, 889 (Ct. App. 
1992) (citing State v. Sandoval, 92 ldaho 853, 861, 952 P.2d 350, 358 (1969)); 
State v. Franklin, 87 ldaho 291, 298, 392 P.2d 552, 555 (1964); State v. 
Breeden, 129 ldaho 813,816,932 P.2d 936,939 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Purdum was a probationer subject to the terms of a court order that he 
accepted. Paragraph 8 of the Probation Order required him to "submit" to a drug 
test when requested by a law enforcement officer. (R., p.95.) In fact, Purdum 
concedes that he was "subject to a search of his blood, breath, or urine" by law 
enforcement officers pursuant paragraph 8 of the Probation Order. (Appellant's 
brief, p.10.) It follows that if Purdurn is to submit to a request for a drug test, then 
a law enforcement officer can approach Purdum and stop him to make the 
request. The record shows that Officer Reeder stated that he intended to stop 
Purdurn "because of [Purdum] being on felony probation and his probation 
stating that any officer may stop him and ask for a UA." (R., p.4.) Purdum 
stipulated that the officer approached him to request a drug test. (R., p.4; 
12/15/2005 Tr., p.1, L.15 - p.4, L.1 I).  There is no indication the officer 
approached Purdum for any other purpose. 
Purdum argues that Officer Reeder was required to possess a separate 
reasonable suspicion that Purdum was violating his probation in order to stop 
Purdum and ask for a urinalysis test. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-8.) This argument 
is unreasonable because probationers like Purdum would be able to forever 
evade court ordered random drug testing by simply running off. As stated 
recently in State v. Cruz, such a situation allows probationers "to play this shell 
game with [I officers [which] would defeat the state's substantial interest in 
closely monitoring" probationers. State v. Cruz, Docket No. 31880, 2007 Opinion 
No. 41, p.7 (June 12,2007). 
Importantly, Purdum never challenged paragraph 8 as unreasonable or 
unrelated to the goals of probation, and has never claimed that he did not 
voluntarily accept probation and its terms, or that he did not have notice of the 
term. (R., pp.44-45.) Based on paragraph 8 of the Probation Order and the 
stipulated facts, the district court correctly concluded that the officer could stop 
Purdum and request a drug test. (R., pp.59-60.) 
Because Paragraph 8 requires Purdum to "submit" to a request for a drug 
test by a law enforcement officer, Purdum's argument is ultimately irrelevant. 
The district court's order denying his motion to suppress should be affirmed. 
D. The Search Of Purdum's Person Was Justified As A Search Incident To 
Arrest 
Although neither the Probation Order, nor the Community Corrections 
Agreement gave Officer Reeder the same authority to search Purdum's person 
or property as it gave Purdum's probation officers, Officer Reeder's searches of 
Purdum are otherwise justified. Where the lower court reaches the correct result 
by relying on an incorrect legal theory, the appellate court will affirm the result 
under the correct legal theory. McKinnev v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 
144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 ldaho 700, 704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 
(1997); see also State v. Rhoades, 134 ldaho 862, 864, 11 P.3d 481,483 (2000). 
The alternative theory need not have been raised before the trial court. State v. 
m, 134 ldaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489,493 (Ct. App. 2000). The state submits 
that Officer Reeder's search of Purdum and his vehicle are justified as a search 
incident to arrest for obstruction of an officer. 
A search incident to a valid arrest is among the well-delineated exceptions 
to the warrant requirement and, thus, does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63 (1969); State v. Moore, 129 ldaho 776, 781, 932 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App. 
1996). Pursuant to this exception, the police may search an arrestee incident to 
a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); 
Moore, 129 ldaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 904. It is of no consequence whether the 
search is conducted before or after the arrest is made. Rawiinas v. Kentuckv, 
448 U.S. 98, Ill (1980). However, the probable cause to arrest must be 
apparent before the search is conducted. State v. Johnson, 137 ldaho 656, 662, 
51 P.3d 1 112, 11 18 (Ct. App. 2002). 
Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person 
of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion that a person they have placed under arrest is guilty of a crime. See 
State v. Julian, 129 ldaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996). Probable 
cause is not measured by the same level of proof required for conviction. Id. 
Rather, probable cause deals with the factual and practical considerations on 
which reasonable and prudent persons act. Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 175 (1949); Julian, 129 ldaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062. When reviewing an 
officer's actions, the court must judge the facts against an objective standard. 
Juiian, 129 ldaho at 136, 922 P.2d at 1062. That is, would the facts available to 
the officer, at the moment of the seizure or search, warrant a reasonable person 
in holding the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Id. A probable cause 
analysis must allow room for mistakes on the part of the arresting officer but only 
the mistakes of a reasonable person acting on facts which sensibly led to his or 
her conclusions of probability. Kerley, 134 ldaho at 874, 11 P.3d at 493 
Officer Reeder had probable cause to arrest Purdum for obstruction of an 
officer once Purdum ran from him. ldaho Code section 18-705 provides: 
Every person who wilfully resists . . . any public officer, in the 
discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his office . . . 
when no other punishment is prescribed, is punishable by a fine not 
exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), and imprisonment in the 
county jail not exceeding one (1) year. 
Three elements must be proven to demonstrate the offense of resisting and 
obstructing an officer: (1) the person who was resisted, delayed or obstructed 
was a law enforcement officer, (2) the defendant knew that the person was an 
officer, and (3) the defendant also knew at the time of the resistance that the 
officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty. I.C. § 18- 705; State 
v. Adams, 138 ldaho 624, 67 P.3d 103 (2003). The word "duty" encompasses 
both lawful and authorized acts of an officer. State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 
16, 27 P.3d 873, 875 (2001). 
Officer Reeder's status as a law enforcement officer has never been 
challenged, and the record ( R  pp.4-6) and Purdum's own arguments 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-10) support this conclusion. Also, Purdum knew that 
Officer Reeder was an officer because Officer Reeder approached Purdum in a 
patrol car with lights. (R., p.4.) Finally, Purdum knew at the time he ran off that 
he was on probation and subject to terms and conditions that required him to 
communicate with law enforcement officers, and that the Probation Order 
required law enforcement officers to perform some duties of supervision (i.e., 
requesting drug tests). Moreover, Officer Reeder indicated he wanted to talk with 
Purdum when he turned on his patrol lights. (R., p.4.) The record, then, shows 
that from the time Purdum first ran from his truck (R., p.4.), Officer Reeder had 
probable cause to arrest him for obstruction, and Officer Reeder indicated he 
would arrest Purdum for this crime when Officer Reeder first made contact with 
Purdum in the shed (R., pp.4-5). Officer Reeder then arrested Purdum prior to 
the search of his person and vehicle for the offense of obstruction of an officer. 
(R., p.5.) 
"The permissible scope and purposes of a search incident to arrest is not 
limited to the removal of weapons but includes the discovery and seizures of 
evidence of crime and articles of value which, if left in the arrestee's possession, 
might be used to facilitate his escape." Moore, 129 ldaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 
904. Once Officer Reeder had arrested Purdum, he could search Purudm's 
person for evidence of crimes and any articles of value that Purdum may use to 
further facilitate his escape 
E. The State's Interests Outweiahed Purdum's Sianificantly Reduced Privacy 
Riqhts Such That Officer Reeder Could Search Purdum's Vehicle Based 
On A Reasonable Suspicion That It Contained Methamphetamine 
When officers searched Purdum incident to arrest they found evidence 
that gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Purdum was using 
methamphetamine. Because probationers do not have the same expectation of 
privacy, this reasonable suspicion justified the search of the car. "The United 
State's Supreme Court recently analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless 
searches of parolees and probationers under the general Fourth Amendment 
approach of examining the totality of the circumstances." State v. Cruz, 2007 
Opinion No. 41, Docket No. 31880, p.4 (June 12, 2007) (citing United States v. 
Kniahts, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). The Supreme Court concluded: 
[tjhe touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and 
the reasonableness of a search "is determined by assessing, on the 
one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's 
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests . . . Inherent in the 
very nature of probation is that probationers "do not enjoy 'the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.' " 
Kniahts, 534 U.S. at 118-1 19 (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 
119 S.Ct. 1297 (1999), Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 
(1 987)). 
On balance, the search of Purdum's vehicle was justified because Purdum 
had a significantly reduced expectation of privacy that was outweighed by the 
government's interest in furthering the goals of probation-rehabilitation and the 
protection of society such that Officer Reeder needed only a reasonable 
suspicion to search Purdum's vehicle. As evidenced by the Fourth Amendment 
waivers Purdum agreed to in paragraph 6 of the Community Corrections 
Agreement and paragraph 14 of the Probation Order, even though these applied 
to probation officers, Purdum received significantly diminished privacy rights 
while on probation. Moreover, the mere fact that Purdum was subject to these 
conditions shows that they were necessary to "further [state's] the two primary 
goals of probation-rehabilitation and protecting society from further criminal 
violations." Kni~hts, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. at 592. On the side of the state's 
interest, like most probationers Purdum was "more likely than the ordinary citizen 
to violate the law" Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880, and had "even more of an incentive to 
conceal [his] criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence . . . 
because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and 
face revocation of probation and possible incarceration," Knights, 534 U.S. at 
120, 122 S.Ct. at 592. In fact, at the time of the search of Purdum's vehicle, 
Purdum was under arrest for violating the law and fled the scene in an attempt to 
conceal his criminal activities. The state's interest, then, outweighs Purdum's 
privacy rights such that under Kni~hts, Officer Reeder needed only possess a 
reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of Purdum's vehicle. 
"[Tjhe degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a 
determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct 
is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable." 
Kniahts, 534 U.S at 121, 122 S.Ct. at 592. Officer Reeder had a reasonable 
suspicion that Purdum, who was subject to search conditions, was engaged in 
criminal activity such that the intrusion into his vehicle was reasonable. Officer 
Reeder knew that Purdum was on probation for methamphetamine possession 
(R., p.4), and had just arrested Purdum for violating the law (R., p.5). 
Officer Reeder discovered multiple items related to methamphetamine use 
on Purdum's person during the search incident to arrest: two bic lighters and one 
butane lighter (R., p.5). Based on these items and Purdum's prior conviction, 
Officer Reeder continued his search into the vehicle Purdum was seen fleeing 
just prior to his arrest. (id.) There, Officer Reeder discovered more evidence of 
methamphetamine use: a butane torch and a can of butane in the glove box, as 
well as a bottle of Visine and a bottle of Golden Seal urinary supplements and a 
number 8 pool ball in the center console. (R., p.5.) Moreover, in the "back of the 
vehicle," Officer Reeder discovered a propane torch. (Id.) Based on his training 
and experience, Officer Reeder identified the items as associated with 
methamphetamine use and proceeded to search Purdum's engine compartment 
because "that's where drugs and paraphernalia are hidden." (R., p.5.) Based 
upon the totality of the circumstances and his training and experience, Officer 
Reeder's search of the engine of Purdum's vehicle produced the homemade 
bong and methamphetamine. (Id.) 
Purdum's challenge to the search of his person or vehicle fails because 
Officer Reeder conducted a lawful search of Purdum's vehicle. Purdum makes 
no attempt on appeal to meet his burden and show otherwise. As a result, the 
district court reached the right conclusion by denying Purdum's motion to 
suppress and the order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the denial of Purdum's 
motion to suppress. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2007. 
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